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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,
adopted in nine states," also reverses the common law
rule.12 The basic purpose of the Act is to achieve a "sharing of
common responsibility according to equity and natural jus-
tice". 1 3 The Act does not create new liability in tort, but mere-
ly creates the right to contribution among those already liable.
Recourse is now allowed by the injured party against the tort-
feasors remaining after the release for their pro-rata shares, 1'
unless said tortfeasors were specifically discharged.16
Whether a release of one joint tortfeasor would release all
in North Dakota has not been decided by the courts. Inasmuch
as the Act was designed to reverse the common law rule,17 the
adoption of the Act by the Legislature"' would indicate that
release of all tortfeasors would require a release specifically
stating the same. A release in the general terms used in this
case would appear not to. come within the spirit and letter of
the Act.
DAVID E. NETHING
TORT-PARENT AND CHILD-CHILD'S RIGHT TO SUE PAR-
ENT-An unemancipated minor child brought an action
against her father for personal injuries sustained by his sim-
ple negligence in the driving of an automobile in which the
child was a passenger. The Superior Court granted the father's
motion for a summary judgement and the plaintiff appealed.
The appeal was certified to the Supreme Court. The Court, in
a split decision, invoked the parental immunity doctrine. It
held that an unemancipated minor child could no maintain a
cause of action against her father. Proceeding further, the
Court held that even though the father had an automobile
liability policy obligating his insurer to pay all sums for which
he was legally responsible, the Suit could not be maintained.
The three dissenting justices, advocating the general harsh-
ness and injustice of the rule, prayed for its overthrow. Hast-
ings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1960).
11. Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
12. Ginoza v. Takai, 40 Hawaii 691 (1955); Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 132,
48 A.2d 353 (1946).
13. Judson v. Peoples Branch and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
14. Steger v. Egyud, 219 Md. 331, 149 A.2d 762 (1959).
15. Daugherty v. Herskberger, 386 Pa- 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956).
16. Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 273, 149 A.2d 648, 651 (1959) (dictum).
17. Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 132, 48 A.2d 353 (1946).
18. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-38-04 (1961).
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RECENT CASES
The parental immunity doctrine in this country evolved
from the 1891 decision in Hewellette v. George.' The court
felt that to allow an unemancipated minor child to maintain
an action against one of his parents would seriously disturb
the family relationship, and would be contrary to public policy.
The case limited the redress by a minor child to the protection
of the criminal law.2 The restraint upon remedy is commonly
imposed to protect the family control and harmony.3 The gen-
eral rule though, allows recovery for wilful and wanton mis-
conduct, as such is considered to destroy the parental relation-
ship.
4
Through the years, the courts have buttressed their con-
clusion of non-recovery with a variety of explanations. Denial
of relief has been justified upon the following grounds: (1)
danger of fraud and collusion if insurance is involved; 5 (2)
the .possibility of succession;, and (3) the depletion of the
family estate.
7
Although no cases could be found allowing recovery for sim-
ple negligence standing alone, the courts have considered var-
ious extenuating factors which limit the general rule and con-
siderably weaken it. In the landmark case of Dunlop v. Dunlop'
the presence of automobile liability insurance was emphasized
as one of two alternative grounds upon which to allow a child
to recover against a parent. The court felt that the reason for
the rule was abrogated by the existence of insurance. 9 Critics
of this position may reply that this is a raid on the insurance
companies, but the insurer can specifically exclude this type
of liability by inserting a limiting clause in the policies.10 Also,
it is submitted, they can be compensated for the additional
risk by charging higher premiums. Although the likelihood of
1. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891).
2. Hewellette v. George, supra note 1; Wich v. Wich, 192 Wis. 260, 212
N.W. 787 (1927).
3. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Wich v. Wich,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927). There is a strong dissent in this case.
4. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v.
Matsoukas, 1 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Henderson v. Henderson,
169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1958); Cowgill v. Broock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
Contra: Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
5. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
6. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905). The parent could
benefit from his own wrongdoing if the child predeceased him, that is. he
would recover back under the intestate laws.
7. IbLd. The family estate would be depleted since one member would
benefit to the detriment of the rest of the family.
8. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930). The
other reason for granting recovery was the employment of the son by his
father, a theory followed by Signs and Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d
743 (1952).
9. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra. p. 912.
10. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) (distum).
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family disharmony would be avoided in cases involving insur-
ance, the possibility of collusion in such cases has been consid-
ered by some courts as a factor in the refusal to alter the gen-
eral rule." Nevertheless, it is argued, minors have always
been permitted to sue their parents in matters affecting prop-
erty and contract rights. 12 The possibility of fraud would seem
to be no greater in those instances, and as stated in some
cases, they would do just as much to disturb the domestic
tranquillity and deplete the family estate as would personal
injury suits.13 If the legislative branch of the government
should be of the opinion that the danger of collusion outweighs
the right of redress, it could abolish that right by legislative
enactment.1
4
It is noteworthy that certain jurisdictions have held that
the doctrine of parental immunity does not extend to a step-
father standing in loco parentis.15 It is submitted that the par-
ental immunity doctrine, in its "strict sense,"' i should also not
be extended to the blood parent and child.
North Dakota has no case law dealing with the immunity
doctrine. In this writer's opinion, the legislature and court's
of this state should bring the law into conformity with present
day standards of wisdom and justice, by taking a liberal ap-
proach to the doctrine. It is a maxim of common law that
there is no wrong without a remedy. Therefore, the child
should be allowed recovery.
WILLIAM JAY JOHNSON
11. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1938); Parks v.
Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65, 73 (1957).
12. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930);
Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, 747 (1952); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d
642, 251 P.2d 149, 153 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk. 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538,
539 (1932).
13. Cowgill v. Broock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445, 452 (1950); Borst v. Borst,
41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 153 (1952).
14. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
15. Burdick v. Nawroki, 21 Conn. Sup, 272, 154 A.2d 242 (1960).
16. By "strict sense" is meant absolutely no immunity. However, aboli-
tion of all parental immunity would be precipitant, for there are situa-
tions where parental authority should be protected, for instance a father's
right to spank his child. Refusing to allow recovery in such cases will work
no undue hardship on the child.
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